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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In these consolidated cases, Leroy S. Wilske appealed from his Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence in a 2013 case where a jury found him guilty of felony
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), misdemeanor
possession of a controlled

substance, and

misdemeanor possession of drug

paraphernalia, and further appealed from his Judgment on Probation Violation and
Disposition in a 2010 case where the district court revoked his probation for felony DUI.
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Wilske asserted that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion to sever in the 2013 case, that the district court erred when it
denied his "motion for a partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case, and that the district
court erred when it found that he had violated his probation in the 2010 case. (App.
Br., pp.8-19.)
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Wilske did not show that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to sever in the 2013 case,
did not show that the district court erred when it denied the "motion for a partial directed
verdict" in the 2013 case, and did not show that the district court erred in concluding that
he violated his probation. (Resp. Br., pp.7-23.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's argument that the district
court did not need to conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis on the motion to sever.

(See

Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Contrary to the State's contention, consideration of Rule 404(b)
was necessary in this case because, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, the
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determination of whether the third potential source of prejudice 1 appears in a case
essentially involves a Rule 404(b) analysis.

See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865,

868 (1983).
The State also argues that, under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991),
Mr. Wilske cannot show he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on the district
court's denial of his "motion for a partial directed verdict," because the district court was
not required to remove the alternative charging theories that were not supported by the
evidence. (See Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) Mr. Wilske concedes that Griffin is controlling
precedent in this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceed in s
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Wilske's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

Idaho's appellate courts have identified three potential sources of prejudice which may
justify the grant of a motion to sever, and the third source is where "the jury may
conclude that the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other
because of his criminal disposition." See, e.g., Abel, 104 Idaho at 867-68.
1
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Wilske's motion to
sever in the 2013 case?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wilske's "motion for a partial directed
verdict" in the 2013 case?

3.

Did the district court err when it found that Mr. Wilske had violated his probation
in the 2010 case?
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ARGUMENT
L
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wilske's Motion To Sever
In The 2013 Case
Mr. Wilske asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to sever in the 2013 case, because the facts of his trial demonstrate that unfair
prejudice resulted from the joint trial and he was therefore denied a fair trial.

At

Mr. Wilske's trial, the third potential source of prejudice-the possibility that the jury may
conclude that he was guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other simply
because of his criminal disposition, i.e., Mr. Wilske is a bad person-appeared. See
State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867-869 {1983).

That potential source of prejudice

appeared because evidence of the misdemeanor charges would not have been
admissible in a separate trial of the felony DUI charge, as it was not relevant to the
felony DUI. See id. at 868; I.RE. 404(b).
When considering the third potential source of prejudice, the Idaho Supreme
Court, like courts in some other jurisdictions, has "engaged in an analysis of the
evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts had been tried
separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence in the different
trials." Abel, 104 Idaho at 868. This essentially involves an Idaho Rule of Evidence
404(b) analysis. See id. at 869.
The State argues that the district court was not required to conduct a Rule 404(b)
analysis of Mr. Wilske's motion to sever pursuant to Abel.

(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)

According to the State, 'That such an analysis is 'useful,' and even dispositive in some
cases, does not mean it is required." (Resp. Br., p.10 (quoting Abel, 104 Idaho at 865).)
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However, consideration of Rule 404(b) was necessary in this case, because upon
review of a denial of a motion to sever, the determination of whether the third potential
source of prejudice appeared in a case such as Mr. Wi!ske's essentially involves a Rule
404(b) analysis. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 869.
The State argues that "since Abel, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that
'whether evidence would have been admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in
determining whether a proper joinder is prejudicial."' (Resp. Br., pp.11 (quoting State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 n.2 (2007)).) The State's reliance upon Field is misplaced

because the Field Court was reviewing the propriety of an initial joinder, which comes
under a different standard than a motion to sever. See Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65. The
Field Court noted, "Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a

question of !aw, over which this Court exercises free review." Id. at 564. The Field
Court further held, "In contrast, an abuse of discretion standard is applied when
reviewing the denial of a motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule
presumes joinder was proper in the first place." Id. at 564-65. Thus, joinder could be
proper under Idaho Criminal Rule 8, but nonetheless prejudicial under Idaho Criminal
Rule 14. See id.
The Field Court's recognition that "whether evidence would have been
admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining whether a proper joinder is
prejudicial," was in the context of determining whether the initial joinder was proper, not
whether the proper joinder was nonetheless prejudicial. See id. As explained above,
those two different questions come under different standards of review. See id. at 56465.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Field did not depart from the Abel analysis for
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determining, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, whether the third potential
source of prejudice appeared.
The Idaho Court of Appeals cases invoked by the State also do not support its
argument. The State cites State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221 (Ct. App. 2013) (Resp.
Br., pp.8, 11 ), but Tankovich is inapposite because the potential source of prejudice at
issue there was the first source, not the third source. The defendant in Tankovich was
charged with malicious harassment and conspiracy to commit malicious harassment,
and sought to sever his trial from the trial of two co-conspirators. Tankovich, 155 Idaho
at 224.

The co-conspirators, but not the defendant, had tattoos displaying symbols

typically associated with white supremacist groups.

Id. at 224, 226.

The defendant

asserted "that evidence of one co-conspirator's intent is not relevant to a charge of
conspiracy against another co-conspirator." Id. at 225. He also asserted "that the tattoo
evidence was unfairly prejudicial and confusing to the jury, and therefore inadmissible
under I.R.E. 403 because he did not have any similar tattoos." Id. at 226. The Court
noted that the defendant's claim of unfair prejudice in support of his motion to sever
"mirrors his argument regarding the admissibility of the evidence of [the coconspirators'] tattoos."

Id. at 227.

Thus, by raising an issue of jury confusion, the

defendant in Tankovich brought his motion to sever under the first potential source of
prejudice, i.e., "the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence,
rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated." See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868.
The Tankovich Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied the motion to sever based on the first source, because "the evidence was
admissible against [the defendant], and he was not unfairly prejudiced by its
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introduction,'' Tankovich, 155 Idaho at 227. Tellingly, the Court also observed that the
defendant "has not asserted that the joinder of his trial resulted in any other form of
prejudice." Id.

Thus, Tankovich does not support the State's argument that a Rule

404(b) analysis is not required when addressing the third potential source of prejudice,
because that case did not deal with the third source.
Nor does State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2013), also cited by the State
(Resp. Br., pp.8, 11 ), support the State's argument.

The Idaho Court of Appeals in

Eguilior clarified that the defendant brought her motion to sever under the third potential

source of prejudice.

Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908.

The State argues that the Eguilior

Court "discussed the cross-admissibility of some evidence, [but] it did not conduct a
404(b) analysis."

(Resp. Br., p.10.)

However, the Eguilior Court actually held that,

"Even if the fourth case had been tried separately, evidence and information on the
marijuana delivery counts likely would have gone before the jury because of its close
relationship with the marijuana counts in the fourth case." Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 908.
Thus, the Court suggested that it properly addressed the third source, by "engag[ing] in
an analysis of the evidence of the separate counts to determine whether, if the counts
had been tried separately, the separate evidence could have been admitted in evidence
in the different trials." See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868.
Further, the cases cited by the Egui/ior Court in reviewing the denial of a motion
to sever, 137 Idaho at 908, used a Rule 404(b) analysis when addressing the third
potential source of prejudice. See State v. Cirelli, 115 Idaho 732, 733 (Ct. App. 1989);
State v. Gooding, 110 Idaho 856, 859 (Ct. App. 1986).
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Thus, upon review of a denial of a motion to sever, the determination of whether
the third potential source of prejudice appeared in a case essentially involves a Rule
404(b) analysis. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 869. The State's argument to the contrary is
unavailing. Because Mr. Wilske's motion to sever primarily implicated the third possible
source of prejudice (see Tr., Nov. 1, 2013, p.7, Ls.21-24), consideration of Rule 404(b)
was necessary in this case.
Because the State's remaining arguments regarding the motion to sever are not
remarkable, no further reply is necessary.

Accordingly, Mr. Wilske simply refers the

Court to pages 8-13 of the Appellant's Brief.

i I.
The District Court Erred When it Denied Mr. Wilske's "Motion For A Partial Directed
Verdict" In The 2013 Case
Mr. Wilske asserted that the district court erred when it denied his "motion for a
partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case, because substantial evidence did not support
his conviction for felony DUI under the alternative theories challenged in the motion.
The State argues that, under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), "the
district court was not required to modify the jury instructions to remove those alternative
charging theories that were not supported by the evidence," and thus Mr. Wilske
"cannot show he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction." (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)
The United States Supreme Court held in Griffin that "if the evidence is
insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be
preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury's
consideration. The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis
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for reversing an otherwise valid conviction."

Griffin, 502 U.S. at 60.

Mr. Wilske

concedes that Griffin is controlling precedent in this case.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Wilske Had Violated His Probation In
The 2010 Case
Mindful of State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308 (Ct. App. 2000), Mr. Wilske asserts
that the district court erred when it found that he had violated his probation in the 201 O
case.

Because the State's argument concerning the probation violation issue is not

remarkable, no further reply is necessary. Accordingly, Mr. Wilske refers the Court to
pages 18-19 of the Appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction in the
2013 case and remand the case to the district court with instruction to sever his
misdemeanor charges from the felony DUI charge to proceed in separate trials.
Alternatively, Mr. Wilske respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment on
probation violation in the 2010 case, and remand the 2010 case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 9 th day of March, 2015.
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